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Is ATKINS THE ANTITHESIS OR APOTHEOSIS OF ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES?: SORTING OUT THE
GROUPWIDE EFFECTS OF EXEMPTING PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
RETARDATION FROM THE DEATH PENALTY
Christopher Slobogin*
In Atkins v. Virginia,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that people with
mental retardation may not be executed. z Many advocates for people with
disability cheered the decision, because it provides a group of disabled peo-
ple with protection from the harshest punishment imposed by our society.
But other disability advocates were dismayed by Atkins, not because they
are fans of the death penalty, but because they believe that declaring dis-
abled people ineligible for a punishment that is accorded all others deni-
grates disabled people as something less than human. If people with disabil-
ity are to be treated equally, these dissenters suggest, they should be treated
equally in all areas of the law, including capital sentencing.
This brief piece explores these two views of Atkins more fully. My con-
clusion is that, while Atkins is neither the apotheosis nor the antithesis of
anti-discrimination principles, overall Atkins is good for the disability rights
movement and for disabled people. After describing the Atkins decision and
its critics, I explain why those who believe Atkins stigmatizes people with
disability are wrong.
I. ATKINS AND ITS CRITICS
Atkins held that execution of people with retardation violates the Consti-
tution, specifically the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. 3 Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court gave essentially two ration-
ales for this result. First, as it has in all of its Eighth Amendment cases in-
volving the death penalty, the Court looked at the degree of national support
for the practice in question.4 It found that 18 of the 36 states with the death
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. This
article is based on a presentation at The University of Alabama School of Law, Equality and Difference:
A Symposium on American Disability Law and the Civil Rights Model (Nov. 7, 2003).
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. Id. at 321.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 313-16.
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penalty enforced a prohibition on execution of people with retardation, 5 and
that even those states which had no such prohibition rarely executed them.6
Justice Stevens also pointed to the statements of various national and inter-
national organizations and to national polls as evidence of professional and
popular opinion favoring the ban.7
In addition to these so-called "objective" measures of consensus, the
Court carried out its own "independent evaluation" of the propriety of exe-
cuting people with retardation.8 It reasoned that because of their significant
impairments in cognition, judgment, and volition, people with mental retar-
dation who commit murder are both less culpable and less deterrable than
most murderers. 9 And as Justice Stevens stated, "If the culpability of the
average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction avail-
able to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender
surely does not merit that form of retribution." '0
Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent. With respect to the first ration-
ale, he noted that the legislative support for the majority's holding-
amounting to 47% of those states with the death penalty-was trivial com-
pared to the type of consensus usually demanded by the Court in the Eighth
Amendment context." And cross-referencing to Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion challenging the methodology of surveys, 12 Scalia dismissed as "fee-
ble" the majority's efforts to find consensus by reference to organizational
and popular opinion.
13
5. Id. at 313-15 (also stating that a mere fourteen years earlier, only two states had such a prohibi-
tion). The stunning change is attributable in large part to disability rights advocates such as James Ellis.
6. Id. at 316.
7. Id. at 316 n.21.
8. Id. at 317-21.
9. Id. at 318-20 (stating that because people with retardation have "diminished capacities to under-
stand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others[,]" their exe-
cution does not "measurably contribute[]" to either the retributive or deterrence goal of capital punish-
ment).
10. Id. at 319. A third rationale given by the majority for its decision in Atkins was the greater
likelihood that people with retardation will confess falsely and provide inadequate assistance to trial and
sentencing counsel. Id. at 320. This rationale, however, amounts to an attack on all criminal prosecutions
of people with retardation, not just capital prosecutions.
11. Id. at 343 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In most of the Court's cases finding an Eighth Amendment
violation, every state, or virtually every state, had already banned the practice, whether it was execution
of incompetent individuals or execution for committing rape. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410
(1986); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). Prior to Atkins, the lowest degree of consensus in a
case finding a violation of the Eighth Amendment had been 78%. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
789 (1982) (noting that 28 out of 36 death penalty states prohibited the death penalty for a robbery in
which an accomplice took a life). In contrast, in two cases where the percentage of death penalty states
prohibiting a particular type of execution was only 30% and 42%, respectively, the Court refused to find
the death penalty cruel and unusual. See also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 154 (1987) (noting that II
of 37 death penalty states prohibited execution of those who participated in a felony with reckless indif-
ference to life); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (citing that 15 out of 36 states prohib-
ited capital punishment of 16 year-old murderers).
12. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321-336 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Scalia was even more bothered by the Court's "independent evalua-
tion." His main concern was that this part of the majority's opinion was
untethered to any objective considerations, and thus smacked of "preten-
sion" and "arrogance."' 4 More relevant to the topic of this article, he also
argued that categorical exemptions based on assessments of relative culpa-
bility and deterrability do not work in an individualized sentencing context
like the one the Court has tried to create in the death penalty setting.' 5 As he
put it,
Surely culpability, and deservedness of the most severe retribution,
depends not merely (if at all) upon the mental capacity of the crimi-
nal (above the level where he is able to distinguish right from
wrong) but also upon the depravity of the crime--which is precisely
why this sort of question has traditionally been thought answerable
not by a categorical rule of the sort the Court today imposes upon
all trials, but rather by the sentencer's weighing of the circum-
stances (both degree of retardation and depravity of crime) in the
particular case. 16
More specifically addressing the majority's assertions about the average
murderer, he asked "what scientific analysis can possibly show that a mildly
retarded individual who commits an exquisite torture-killing is 'no more
culpable' than the 'average' murderer in a holdup-gone-wrong or a domes-
tic dispute?"'
' 7
Although Scalia's opinion does not directly advance it, there is a third,
related criticism of the majority opinion in Atkins--one voiced by disability
rights advocates. Probably the best statement of this criticism comes from
Donald Bersoff, a well-known champion of disability rights whose views
need to be taken seriously. ' 8 In a recent Law & Human Behavior article, he
put forward two complaints about the stigmatizing impact of Atkins.' 9 First,
he wrote, it mischaracterizes the capacities of people with mental retarda-
tion.20 As he put it, "[a]s important as it is to protect those who cannot pro-tect themselves, it is equally important to promote the right of all persons to
14. Id. at 348.
15. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (requiring "particularized
consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the
imposition upon him of a sentence of death")
16. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 350-5 1.
17. Id. at 350.
18. Bersoff, who is a Professor of Law Emeritus at Villanova Law School, has published on a wide
array of topics in mental health law, once partnered with Bruce Ennis and the Mental Health Law Pro-
ject, and has served as General Counsel to the American Psychological Association.
19. Donald N. Bersoff, Some Contrarian Concerns About Law, Psychology, and Public Policy, 26
LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 565, 568-69 (2002). Bersoff emphasizes that, despite his complaints, he remains
"adamantly opposed to the death penalty for anyone." Id. at 568. However, he believes that "Justice
Scalia's particularized approach is, in the long run, more protective of the rights of people with mental
retardation." Id. at 569 n.2.
20. Id. at 568.
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make their own choices and, as a corollary, to be accountable for those
choices.",21 Echoing Justice Scalia, he then stated, "It is simply untrue that
no person with mental retardation is incapable of carrying out a horrible
murder with the requisite [degree of] intent or foresight., 22 Secondly, Pro-
fessor Bersoff suggested that Atkins may even lead to a retraction of the
rights and privileges that people with disability currently possess. He as-
serted,
If we accept the concept of blanket incapacity [which Atkins en-
dorses], we relegate people with retardation to second class citizen-
ship, potentially permitting the State to abrogate the exercise of
such fundamental interests as the right to marry, to have and rear
one's children, to vote, or such everyday entitlements as entering
into contracts or making a will.
23
II. WHY ATKINS DOES NOT STIGMATIZE
If true, Professor Bersoff s objections to the Atkins majority's "inde-
pendent evaluation" are potent.24 I think that his objections are off-base,
however. Indeed, I have argued in a recent article that Atkins is not only a
good decision, but that it should be expanded to prohibit execution of peo-
ple who were seriously mentally ill at the time of the offense.25 My dis-
agreement with Professor Bersoff can be stated succinctly.
With respect to the mischaracterization issue, it is true, as both Justice
Scalia and Professor Bersoff state, that some people with serious mental
disability can commit murder with intent and even foresight. I also have
doubts about the Atkins majority's statement that no mentally retarded per-
son who murders is as culpable or deterrable as the average murderer26 (and
am especially leery of the lesser deterrability assertion, given the evidence
that most criminals pay little attention to criminal prohibitions). 27 Neverthe-
less, I think it is clear that no murderer whose retardation or psychosis con-
tributes to the crime is as culpable as the rare murderer who should be put
to death. If we are to have the death penalty, only the most depraved indi-
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 1 express no opinion here about the debate over the "objective" analysis of national consensus.
25. Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV.
293 (2003).
26. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
27. See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
453, 458-64 (1997) (describing reasons why most criminals are not deterred by criminal prohibitions). I
have tried to develop a definition of "true" undeterrability, which would apply only to a very narrow
group composed primarily of seriously disabled people and individuals who would knowingly choose
crime over freedom. Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. I,
40-46 (2003).
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viduals should be executed, as the Court has said over and over again.28 No
person with serious disability is that depraved.
But what about Justice Scalia's mentally retarded torturer? Or someone
like John Penry, who had an IQ in the 60s, but who cased the residence of
his victim to make sure she was alone, forced his way in when she grew
suspicious of his repairman story, and stabbed her after deciding she might
tell the police about the rape?29 Or someone like Renard Atkins, a mildly
retarded individual who, along with another individual, abducted his victim,
forced him to withdraw money from an ATM, then took him to a deserted
area and shot him eight times? 30 These people intended, and even premedi-
tated their crimes, knowing that they were wrong in doing so.
It can be assumed that all of these offenders were legally sane at the
time of their crime. Because of their retardation, however, people like
Scalia's torturer, Penry, and Atkins lack the full appreciation of wrongful-
ness that less disabled people have and that should be required before we
can execute someone.3' While there is not necessarily a directly inverse
relationship between intellectual vulnerability and evil, or between madness
and badness, the criminal law has long acknowledged that mental and emo-
tional problems compromise the cognitive and volitional capacities that are
equated with blameworthiness. 32 As recognized most explicitly by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in the 1960s, culpability is diminished by an inability
28. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (setting aside a death sentence because
the crime did not reflect "a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of
murder"). See generally Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876-77 (1983) (speaking of the "fundamental
requirement that ... an aggravating circumstance... genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for
the death penalty and ... reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant
compared to others found guilty of murder").
29. Respondent's Brief at 2, Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (No. 00-6677).
30. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. Consider these statements by the American Association on Mental Retardation (quoted by
Justice Brennan in Penry):
"Every individual who has mental retardation"--irrespective of his or her precise capacities or
experiences--has "a substantial disability in cognitive ability and adaptive behavior." This is
true even of the "highest functioning individuals in the 'mild' retardation category," and of
course of those like Penry whose cognitive and behavioral disabilities place them on the bor-
derline between mild and moderate retardation. Among the mentally retarded, "reduced abil-
ity is found in every dimension of the individual's functioning, including his language, com-
munication, memory, attention, ability to control impulsivity, moral development,
self-concept, self-perception, suggestibility, knowledge of basic information, and general mo-
tivation."
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 345 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting brief of American Association on Mental Retardation) (citations omitted). See also C. Benjamin
Crisman & Rockne J. Chickinell, The Mentally Retarded Offender in Omaha-Douglas County, 8
CREIGHTON L. REV. 622, 646 (1975) (stating that although mentally retarded persons "may be able to
distinguish right from wrong in the abstract," they have difficulty "applying ... abstract concepts to
specific factual settings"); James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defen-
dants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414,441 (1985).
32. The insanity, diminished capacity, and diminished responsibility defenses are all examples of
this. More to the point, every death penalty statute explicitly or implicitly stipulates that mental disorder
at the time of the offense be considered as a possible mitigating circumstance. See Ellen Fels Berkman,
Mental Illness As an Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 296-98
(1989). See generall, GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 190-208 (2d ed. 1997).
HeinOnline  -- 55 Ala. L. Rev. 1105 2003-2004
Alabama Law Review
to "maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of [the] contem-
plated act."33 People with retardation, by definition, are compromised in that
ability. According to the latest edition of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, even people with "mild" mental
retardation at most can develop academic skills up to approximately the
sixth-grade level, amounting to the maturity of a twelve year-old.34 By ex-
empting this whole category of people from its purview, Atkins constitu-
tionalized the idea that the death penalty may only be imposed on people
who are particularly culpable.
Of course, many people would not draw the line where the Atkins ma-
jority did. For instance, three separate juries found that Penry was depraved
enough to warrant the death penalty.35 Atkins, in essence, held that those
juries were wrong in defining depravity so broadly. It also implicitly re-
jected Justice Scalia's position that the brutality of a murder by itself, re-
gardless of the associated mental state, can make a sane person sufficiently
"depraved."
Most importantly for present purposes, Atkins's holding (as distin-
guished, perhaps, from some of its language about the average murderer)
does not mischaracterize the capacities of people with disability in the way
Professor Bersoff suggests. Atkins does not say that people with retardation
are incapable of committing crime with intent or foresight. Nor, of course,
does it say that murderers with serious disability should not be held ac-
countable for their choices, as they still can be given life sentences. All At-
kins says is that people with retardation, even those who commit a "horri-
ble" murder, can never be as evil as the most evil murderers in our society
(and thus that the ultimate punishment may not be imposed on them).
For related reasons, I also disagree with Professor Bersoff's claim that
Atkins will encourage use of categorical disability-based exemptions in the
civil rights setting. While people with serious disability never deserve the
death penalty, it is an empirical fact, demonstrated by research examining
both people with significant mental illness and mental retardation,36 that
even very disabled people can be competent to make treatment decisions
and engage in other decision-making tasks. Nothing in Atkins can be used to
contest that fact, not even its (possibly erroneous) statement that people
33. People v. Wolff, 394 P.2d 959, 975 (1964) (emphasis omitted).
34. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 43 (4th ed.-revised 2000).
35. An account of Penry's first two death sentences, both of which were overturned by the Supreme
Court, is found at Penry v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2001). Penry was retried and resentenced to
death a third time, prior to Atkins. Penry v. Coker, No. 15918-04, 2003 WL 21401978, at *1 (Tex. Crim.
App. June 18, 2000).
36. Thomas Grisso & Paul Appelbaum, Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical
Treatments, 19 LAW & HUM BEHAV. 149, 171 (1995) (finding that nearly one-half of the schizophrenia
group performed in the "adequate" range across all decision-making measures, and that a significant
portion performed at or above the mean for persons without mental illness); MELTON ET AL., supra note
32, at 144 (reporting research finding that many people with mental retardation are competent to stand
trial, whether measured psychometrically, or judicially).
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with retardation cannot be as culpable or deterrable as the average mur-
derer.37 The inquiry in the civil setting is not whether the disabled person is
"average," but whether the person meets a minimum level of competence. 38
In other words, even a person whose capacities are "below average" can,
under the law, contract, marry, vote, and so on. 39 Thus, neither the holding
nor the unnecessarily broad language of Atkins sabotages these types of
laws.
If Atkins does anything in terms of stigma, it de-stigmatizes people with
mental disability. Research clearly shows that, despite the fact that offend-
ers with serious disorders are no more likely to reoffend than the general
offender population, 40 the public tends to equate mental disorder with dan-
gerousness. Capital sentencing juries are not immune from this mispercep-
tion, with the result that they often treat mental disorder not as a mitigating
circumstance (as the law requires)42 but as an aggravating circumstance
supporting imposition of the death penalty. 43 Atkins can and should be inter-
preted to mean that this equation of disorder with danger is wrong. Its mes-
sage should be: we cannot execute people (or do anything else to them)
simply because we are irrationally scared of them.
37. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319-20 (2002).
38. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-101 (amended 1982 and 1989), which permits an incompe-
tency finding for a person with mental disability only if he or she "lacks sufficient understanding or
capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person.
39. However, I disagree with Steven Schwartz's suggestion, in his talk for this Symposium, that all
people with disability should be considered competent. Steven J. Schwartz, Disabling Protections, Pref-
erential Rights and a Vision of Equality, presented at The University of Alabama School of Law, Equal-
ity and Difference: A Symposium on American Disability Law and the Civil Rights Model (Nov. 7,
2003). Permitting a person with an IQ of 40 to sign a contract, for instance, makes a mockery of the idea
of autonomy, and presumably would occur only if the person were told to do so, in good faith or bad, a
paternalistic outcome which a disability rights advocate such as Schwartz would presumably find repug-
nant.
40. See James Bonta et al., The Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism Among Mentally
Disordered Offenders: A Meta Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 123 (1988) (meta-analysis finding that the
major predictors of recidivism were the same for mentally disordered offenders as for non-disordered
offenders, and that psychopathology should be de-emphasized as a predictor).
41. See, e.g., Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., The Public's View of the Competence, Dangerousness,
and Need for Legal Coercion of Persons with Mental Health Problems, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1339,
1341 (1999) (reporting that 17% of a random sample of citizens felt that a "troubled person" was "very
likely" or "somewhat likely" to be violent, 33.3% said the same of the depressed person, and 60% said
the same of a person with schizophrenia).
42. See Berkman, supra note 32, at 296-98.
43. The empirical evidence for this assertion, which is very strong, is collected in Christopher Slo-
bogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 667, 669-70
(2000).
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